Abstract. Exploiting the panel data structure of the Family Income and Expenditure Survey, compiled from 1989 to 1997 by the Japanese Bureau of Statistics, this paper explores how effectively idiosyncratic shocks are shared among consumers in Japan. Tests are conducted for the total consumption, together with each category of consumption expenditures. Exploring possible theoretical interpretations of estimated parameters, this paper shows that the full insurance hypothesis is rejected statistically, but that a large fraction of idiosyncratic shocks are still insured in markets or other mechanisms. It also points out that the extent of risk-sharing among households in Japan is fairly similar to that in the US.
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1. Introduction How effectively idiosyncratic shocks are insured among consumers, families, cohorts, regions, and countries has been explored most intensively in consumption literature. The main reason for a strong interest in tests of consumption insurance is that the knowledge as to the degree of insurance for idiosyncratic shocks is essential in constructing reasonable macroeconomic models, based on microeconomic theory. More concretely, if idiosyncratic shocks are well insured among consumers, then macroeconomists can adopt a representative agent framework as an appropriate model, otherwise they have to construct alternative models.
It is well recognized in the literature that 'insurance' includes not only insurance contracts offered in financial markets, but also arrangements implicitly made in communities, such as altruistic family linkages and mutual aids, and governmental assistance, such as welfare programs and public insurance. The literature has indeed examined empirical implications of consumption insurance using micro data available from developing countries where financial and insurance markets have not been developed well.
Townsend [1987] first derived clear empirical implications for the full insurance hypothesis. That is, if idiosyncratic shocks are perfectly shared in complete markets, then consumption moves similarly over time among consumers. More specifically, the individual consumption growth should be identical among consumers under the assumption of a utility function with constant relative risk aversion (CRRA). Cochrane [1991] and Mace [1991] empirically examined this implication concerning the full insurance hypothesis using micro panel data of US households 1 . More recently, the full insurance hypothesis has been examined for developed countries, other than the US, and for several developing countries (e.g. Townsend [1994] , Atkeson and Ogaki [1996] , and Ogaki and Zhang [2001] ).
There have been, however, very few studies on the full insurance hypothesis in the literature on Japanese consumption behavior. One reason for this is that micro panel data themselves are hard to obtain for Japanese households. Among a few empirical studies on consumption behavior using panel data sets on Japanese households, Hayashi [1985a, 1 Among the empirical studies using US micro household data, empirical results are mixed. Using the same data source (Consumer Expenditure Survey Data), for example, Mace [1991] supported the full insurance hypothesis, while Nelson [1994] rejected it, based on more accurate measurements of consumption and income.
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2 1985b] conducted a test of the permanent income hypothesis. Hayashi [1985a] used the 1982 Survey of Family Consumption, compiled by the Economic Planning Agency. In this survey, each family is interviewed every three months for one year. Hayashi [1985b] , on the other hand, used the 1981/82 Family Income and Expenditure Survey (hereafter referred to as FIES) conducted by the Japanese Bureau of Statistics. While the latter survey has been quite often regarded as cross-sectional micro data, it has panel data structure. That is, the survey interviews the same household every month for six months.
Making use of the above panel structure of the FIES from 1989 to 1997, we test the full insurance hypothesis. To the best of our knowledge, Kohara [2001] is the only study that investigated the full insurance hypothesis, based on micro panel data for Japanese households. Kohara [2001] used the 1993 and 1994 Japanese Panel Surveys of Consumption (hereafter, the JPSC), compiled by the Institute of Household Economy. The JPSC has surveyed the same households once a year since 1993. Although this survey is significant, given the scarcity of panel data sets in Japan, the JPSC has rather small samples of around 1000 households each year.
As has been well recognized, the interpretation of tests for the full insurance hypothesis requires serious and careful attention. The rejection of a certain specification of the hypothesis does not necessarily imply that idiosyncratic shocks are never insured among households. For example, our empirical specification may be subject to specification errors in preference or belief, while a rejection result may suggest the case where asymmetric information leads to not full insurance, but partial risk sharing. In addition, we have to pay careful attention to the econometric impact of preference shocks and measurement errors in interpreting estimation results.
Motivated by the above-mentioned possibilities, we are interested in not only whether the full insurance hypothesis is accepted, but also to which extent it holds. For this purpose, we carefully compare our empirical results with those based on US micro data in order to see how the extent of risk sharing differ between the two countries. In addition, we examine how the estimation results differ among subcategories of the consumption. This paper is organized as follows. Following Mace [1991] , Section 2 presents empirical specifications to test the fill insurance hypothesis. Section 3 reports the estimation results, 3 while Section 4 concludes.
Empirical Specifications
This subsection briefly reviews the aggregation theorem, on which Mace [1991] depends in deriving the empirical specifications to test the full insurance hypothesis. Suppose that a market exists for every possible state, and that a contingent claim for state ω(t) at time t is traded at price p(ω(t)) when an economy starts at time 0. Agent i maximizes the following life-time expected utility at time 0:
where ρ is the rate of time preference, Ω(t) denotes a set of states at time t, π(ω(t)) is the objective unconditional probability that state ω(t) takes place at time t, and u is the time-additive and state-independent period utility. u ′ (c i (ω(t))) > 0 and u ′′ (c i (ω(t))) < 0 are assumed to be true. c i , e i , and d i indexed by state ω(t) imply agent i's consumption, exogenous income, and transfer from other consumers at state ω(t), respectively.
Assuming that λ i is the Lagrange multiplier for agent i's life-time budget constraint, and deriving the first-order condition with respect to agent i's ω(t)-consumption, we obtain
Using the above first-order condition (1), it is possible to derive from equation (1) the equality of the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between two different states among consumers. That is, taking two states, ω(t) and ω(t + 1) for example, we obtain, after canceling out the Lagrange multipliers λ i and λ j ,
Notice that the homogenous belief about π(ω(t)) is essential for the derivation of equation (2) .
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In addition, as Rubinstein [1974] showed, when the utility function u belongs to the hyperbolic absolute risk aversion family (the HARA family), the MRS, evaluated at individual consumption, is equal to that evaluated at aggregate consumption, or
where
or per capita aggregate consumption.
It is noted that both equations (2) and (3) hold for any realized path of consumption.
Under the null hypothesis of full insurance, accordingly, these equations impose rather tight restrictions on the realized path of individual and aggregate consumption. More concretely, the realized first difference in consumption is perfectly equal among consumers, and is also equal to the realized difference in per capita aggregate consumption, under the constant absolute risk aversion preference (u(c) = − 1 σ exp(−σc), hereafter, the CARA preference).
That is,
Similarly, the growth in consumption is equalized among consumers under the CRRA utility (u(c) =
, and is, accordingly, equal to the realized growth of per capital consumption:
Examining the empirical implications of equations (4) and (5) In transforming these theoretical implications into statistical specifications, empirical researchers usually introduce either measurement errors or individual preference shocks as additive error terms. As Mace [1991] shows, if person-specific preference shocks are introduced in an additive (multiplicative) manner in the case of the CARA (CRRA) preference, then equations (4) and (5) with additive error terms are available as a proper specification.
However, the potential impact of preference shocks on leisure or working hours may cause serious econometric problems. We will come back to this issue later.
As is well-known, if the period utility is additively separable in not only time, but also goods, then equations (4) and (5) are applicable even to subcategories of the consumption 2 .
As shown in the appendix by Mace [1991] , however, even if the period preference is inseparable in goods, equations (4) and (5) may hold for subcategories. Examples include the case where the period utility is characterized by
, where M is the number of subcategories, and α, θ i , and γ are given as parameters 3 .
Data and Estimation Results
Data
In this study, we use the Family Income and Expenditure Survey (FIES) for Japanese households from 1989 to 1997, conducted by the Japanese Bureau of Statistics.
While it has been quite often regarded as cross-sectional micro household data, it indeed has panel data structure. The FIES interviews the randomly sampled households every month.
The sample size is equal to around 4200 households. Replacing one sixth of the total sample (about 700 households) every month, the survey interviews the same households every month for six consecutive months.
The sample of the FIES consists of three major categories of households, the household of a proprietor, that with an employed head, and that with an unemployed head. While we attempt to make the estimation sample as large as possible, we exclude the first category of households from the full sample because no information on household income is available for these households. Our estimation sample consequently includes the second and third
The categories of household consumption used in the empirical analysis are the total consumption, together with expenditure on services, nondurables, and durables, as broadly classified categories, and food, housing, utilities, furniture, clothes, medical expenses, trans-2 For example, see Deaton [1992] . 3 If α 1−γ = 1, then the period utility is additively separable in subcategories of the consumption. The intra-period elasticity of substitution is infinite for γ = 0, while it is zero for γ = ∞. 4 To examine the effect of the sex of household heads, we apply the same estimation procedure to the sample consisting of only male household heads. However, we could not find any substantial difference in the empirical results between the sample of male household heads and the full sample.
portation, education, and recreation, as finely classified categories. See the data appendix for more details on these categories of expenditure.
Exploiting the panel data structure of the FIES, we construct the first difference and growth in individual household consumption over nine years. Among possible constructions, we compute one-month changes, which are the shortest intervals, and five-month changes, which are the longest intervals. As is discussed later, the empirical results based on a long interval may take into consideration, the slow adjustment of household consumption, due to some frictions or habit formation.
As a variable representing a person-specific shock, we use the household income, which consists of labor income, personal business income, property income, and social security benefits. In addition, following Mace [1991] , we use as another candidate of person-specific shocks, a change in the employment status (from employed to unemployed, and vice versa) among all household members.
When a change in the household income is used for representing person-specific shocks, the first difference in the household income is used in the first difference specification (4), while the growth rate of the household income is adopted in the growth specification (5) . If the full insurance hypothesis holds, any realized person-specific shocks do not have any effect on a change in the household consumption. Thus, we examine whether the coefficient on person-specific shocks is significantly different from zero in order to test the above hypothesis.
We exclude any household in which the consumption and income data are not complete.
The sample size consequently amounts to around 3000 each month. Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics for basic variables of the household consumption and income. As is reasonably expected, the monthly profile of consumption has a systematic pattern. For example, Table 2 shows how major items of consumption expenditures changed on the average in 1997; the consumption increased in March, July and December, while it decreased in January and April. The monthly profile in other years almost follows this same pattern.
Before reporting the estimation results, we make two remarks here. First, the empirical results may be subject to the heterogeneity of household members. To account for this possibility, we estimate the above specification using not only the variables defined per Second, due to the Hyogo Earthquake that impacted the Kansai area in January 1995, the survey failed to interview a substantial fraction of the sample households in this area.
After the earthquake, accordingly, the sample size was small in comparison with the usual size of 3000 households per month. It took six months for the sample size to return to the pre-disaster level.
Basic specifications
We first report the empirical results for the basic specification. When a change in the household income is used as a proxy for a person-specific shock, the empirical specification is characterized as (6) in the case of the first difference specification (4), and as ln C i t+1
in the case of the growth specification (5) Third, seasonality may affect the empirical results. We also estimated the basic specification with monthly dummy variables. While the monthly dummy variables of July and March, given December as the base month, were significantly positive at the 1% level, the coefficients on aggregate consumption and individual income were almost the same as in the case without monthly dummy variables.
Fourth, unless the period utility is separable between consumption and leisure, the above empirical specification may not hold. In other words, when the marginal period utility of consumption depends on leisure, the growth (or first difference) of household consumption may be influenced by changes in leisure spent by households. As a similar situation, consumption and leisure may be correlated with each other through preference shocks; for example, the impact of illness on preference may result in a decline in not only consumption, but also working hours. We will carefully treat this potential relation between household consumption and leisure (working hours) in interpreting the estimation results.
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Fifth, what is more fundamental for our research, the rejection of β 1 = 1 and β 2 = 0 does not necessarily imply that idiosyncratic shocks are never insured among households. A problem with one of our maintained assumptions is potentially responsible for the failure of the full insurance hypothesis under the above specification. First, once subsistence levels are considered as in Atkeson and Ogaki [1996] and Ogaki and Zhang [2001] , equations (4) and (5) usually fail to hold; consequently, the coefficient on household income may not be zero even under the full insurance hypothesis. Second, the heterogeneity in belief or risk aversion among consumers again forces β 1 = 1 and β 2 = 0 to be rejected even with the full insurance.
Finally, when not full, but partial risk sharing arises due to asymmetric information in contracting insurance, the estimation result may indicate that β 1 is significantly less than one, but still close to one; similarly β 2 may be significantly greater than zero, but still close to zero.
3.3. Possible interpretations of estimates of β 1 and β 2 Motivated by the abovementioned possibilities, we are interested in not only whether the full insurance hypothesis is accepted, but also to which extent it holds. For this purpose, the estimation result available from the growth specification is fairly suggestive. Depending on the degree of insurance, estimates of β 2 possibly range from zero for the null hypothesis, or the full insurance where idiosyncratic shocks are perfectly insured, to one for the total absence of insurance (though it is unlikely) 6 . Accordingly, the magnitude of estimated β 2 , farther from zero or closer to one, may imply the extent to which idiosyncratic shocks are uninsured in markets or other mechanisms.
How can estimates of β 1 be interpreted? As mentioned above, our estimation procedures employ as aggregate consumption growth, (i) the difference in logarithms of average consumption, rather than (ii) the average of the difference in logarithms of individual consumption. As is known in the asset pricing literature (for example, see Saito [1998] ), due to the presence of uninsured shocks, the latter definition (ii) of aggregate consumption growth is usually smaller than the former (i). In the regression, therefore, coefficients on aggregate consumption growth β 1 may pick up this difference between these two definitions, and may be lower than one. As suggested in Mace [1991] , however, the difference between (i) and
(ii) may reflect not only uninsured idiosyncratic shocks on income, but also person-specific multiplicative preference shocks, and it is difficult to distinguish between these two shocks from only estimation results about β 1 . For this reason, we will mainly interpret estimates of β 2 below.
With regard to the interpretation of β 2 , we will compare carefully our empirical results with those based on US micro data in order to see how the extent of risk sharing differ between the two countries. We will also examine how the estimation results differ among subcategories of the consumption. Table 3 The above pattern of the rejection for the full insurance hypothesis is fairly robust with respect to alternative specifications. As shown in the second panel (Panel B), this pattern holds for the case of five-month changes. The full insurance implication is rejected strongly for most items. While it is supported for expenditure on education as well as housing, the results may again reflect the durable nature of these expenditures. As Table 4 reports, the rejection pattern is still observed when the growth specification (7) is adopted, instead of the first difference specification for one-month changes. The full insurance implication is again rejected strongly for all of the expenditure categories. Table 5 reports the results for the specification including dummy variables for changes in employment status among household members. In the empirical model to be estimated, the variable associated with the coefficient accounting for change in employment status is the variable that takes the value of one when a household member becomes employed for one month, minus one when a member becomes unemployed during the period, and zero otherwise 7 . The empirical results again indicate that the full insurance hypothesis is rejected.
Estimation results The first panel (Panel A) of
A closer look at the estimation results reported by Table 4 (the growth specification), however, indicates that the income sensitivity (β 2 ) is statistically significant, but rather small for subcategories of consumption as well as total consumption. More specifically, these estimated coefficients are much smaller than one, a possible maximum value of β 2 which is estimated for the case of a complete failure of insurance though it is unlikely (see footnote 6). Similarly, the estimated coefficients on aggregate consumption growth (β 1 ) is significantly different from one, but still close to one. Considering those estimation results,
we can conclude that a large fraction of idiosyncratic shocks are still insured in markets or other mechanisms.
The estimation results also indicate that how they deviate from the full insurance differs among subcategories of consumption. Among the broadly classified categories, on the one hand, the sensitivity to household income (β 2 ) is the highest for durables and the lowest for nondurables. Among items, on the other hand, β 2 is smaller for the expenditures on food (0.02), housing (0.02), utilities (0.01), and medical care 8 (0.02) than those on other items; for reference, it is 0.06 for total consumption. These estimation results concerning β 2 suggest that idiosyncratic shocks are insured relatively well for the consumption of necessities.
In regard to coefficients on aggregate consumption growth (β 1 ), on the other hand, the extent of deviation of β 1 from one does not necessarily correspond to the degree of deviation of β 2 from zero among the broadly classified categories, or item by item. One possible interpretation for these results is that, as mentioned before, estimated β 1 may reflect not only uninsured idiosyncratic shocks on income, but also person-specific preference shocks, while estimated β 2 may reflect only the former.
We make several comments on the interpretation of the above empirical results. First, 7 Note that household heads are always employed or self-employed in our data set. 8 The medical expenditure here does not include that covered by the National Health Insurance system. Therefore, the effect of the public insurance is not reflected in the estimation results reported by this paper.
as discussed before, consumption may be correlated with leisure (working hours) through either the inseparability between consumption and leisure, or preference shocks. Such a correlation may yield positive coefficients on household income in equations (6) and (7) even under the full insurance hypothesis. In principle, such problems should be treated by a proper choice of instrumental variables.
The above correlation problem, however, may be handled properly, when we use as a sample set only households whose head is employed. For such a household sample with employed heads only, household leisure or working hours does not change substantially over time; consequently, the length of leisure (working hours) is controlled to some extent. In particular, if the household labor income is replaced by the employment status (working or not) among household members in the empirical specification, the problem associated with correlation becomes even less serious. Among most households, the intertemporal change in the employment status is caused by that of a spouse. Accordingly, changes in the employment status tends to reflect the choice of a spouse between market activity and household production, not between working hours and leisure. Therefore, the length of household leisure (working hours) is controlled as almost constant. Although the estimation result is not reported in this paper, we find that the full insurance hypothesis is still rejected strongly for the case where the family employment status is used as a regressor with the sample that consists of only households with employed heads.
Second, if consumption is inseparable in time, as for durables, the absence of lagged consumption in the specification may result in a correlation between the error term and the labor income term. Because the durability becomes weaker as time increases, such a correlation can be controlled if first differences (growth rates) are defined with a longer interval. As is shown in Panel A and B of Table 3 , the empirical results, based on fivemonth changes (growth), do not differ substantially from those based on one-month changes (growth). Thus, the empirical results available from the basic specification are robust with respect to alternative specifications, and neither non-separability between consumption and leisure nor time-non-separability is responsible for rejecting the full insurance hypothesis. In terms of the total consumption, the sensitivity to household income (β 2 ) is fairly similar between the two countries. While it is 0.06 in our case (see Table 4 ), those based on US data indicate that the sensitivity is 0.04 in Mace [1991] , 0.05 in Cochrane [1991] , and 0.05 in Nelson [1994] . Given that our sample size is much larger than theirs, our estimation obtains more precise estimates for the sensitivity.
Looking at Mace [1991] more closely, we compare the estimation results item by item.
In Mace [1991] , the sensitivity to household income is not significantly different from zero for the expenditures on housing (0.01), utilities (0.002), household furnishings (-0.004), and medical care (0.02), implying that idiosyncratic shocks are well insured for the consumption of these items. As discussed in the previous subsection, the pattern observed in Mace [1991] is very similar to that of our estimation results. That is, although the sensitivity is significantly positive for all items, it is much smaller for the expenditures on food, housing, utilities, and medical care, than for other subcategories of the consumption.
The above comparison suggests that the extent and pattern of risk sharing among households do not differ substantially between the two countries.
Conclusion
In this paper, we examine the full insurance hypothesis using the Family Income and Expenditure Survey data, from 1989 to 1997, whose panel data structure has never been exploited seriously for testing the full insurance hypothesis. The overall empirical results suggest that the full insurance hypothesis is strongly rejected for most items of consumption expenditures.
A closer look at the estimation results, however, indicates that households succeed to buffer themselves against a large fraction of the idiosyncratic shocks that they experience, in particular for the consumption of necessities. In addition, we find that the extent and pattern of risk sharing among households do not differ substantially between Japan and the US. (2) ***, **, and * indicate that the estimated coefficient is significant at the 0.1 percent, 1 percent and 5 percent levels respectively. (2) ***, **, and * indicate that the estimated coefficient is significant at the 0.1 percent, 1 percent and 5 percent levels respectively. (2) ***, **, and * indicate that the estimated coefficient is significant at the 0.1 percent, 1 percent and 5 percent levels respectively. (1) In the second column, our null hypothesis is that the coefficient on aggregate consumption (β 1 ) equals 1, while that on any of the changes in employment status equals 0.
(2) Standard errors are in parentheses. (3) ***, **, and * indicate that the estimated coefficient is significant at the 0.1 percent, 1 percent and 5 percent levels respectively.
Data Appendix: Thirteen Items of Consumption Expenditures
Classified Items Classification : "the FIES Classification Name" [Classification Code] Food "food" [1] Housing "housing" [2] Utilities "heating and water" [3] Furniture "furniture and household goods" [4] Clothes "clothes and footwear" [5] Medical Expenses "medical expenses" [6] Transportation "transportation and communication" [7] Education "education" [8] 
